ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Concerning the routing choice behaviour in networks, Wardrop presented two famous principles: the user equilibrium (UE) and the system optimum (SO) 1 . The UE principle states that every traveller aims to minimize their own cost so that no traveller can reduce the cost by unilaterally changing their choice at the equilibrium. In the game theory version, the traffic assignment under the UE principle can be regarded as a non-cooperative Nash game with many infinitesimal users, and all users are competitive to each other. It is, in the game terminology, a non-atomic routing game. In the case of SO, it is assumed that there exists a central organization to minimize the total cost of the system, all users being cooperative and instructed by a single player. The above two principles only consider the two extreme cases, i.e., there are many infinitesimal players in the UE principle and there is only one central player in the SO principle. Haurie and Marcotte investigated the network with some non-cooperative Cournot-Nash (CN) players, where the users belonging to the same player can fully cooperate with each other and different players will compete with each other 2 . The users of one CN player aim to minimize their own total cost while competing with the users of other players. Harker examined that the network users can be divided into different CN players and UE users and obtained a new network equilibrium model 3 . Yang et al. considered such a situation in which the network has an additional player aiming to improve the overall system performance by controlling part of flows and further extended the above model 4 . Recently, Yang and Zhang studied the existence of anonymous link tolls in network with UE-CN mixed equilibrium behaviours 5 It is well known that the UE is generally not identical with the SO as viewed from the total system cost. However, the gap between the SO and the UE in the worst case had been unknown for a long time. Papadimitriou presented the efficiency loss (the price of anarchy) to measure the efficiency loss for the user's selfish behaviour and defined it as the largest ratio between the total cost of Nash equilibrium and the total cost of an optimal solution achieved by centralized control 6 . Later, Roughgarden and Tardos introduced it into the traffic network and used it to quantify the difference between the UE and the SO 7 . Recently, researchers have extended the above works in different aspects [8] [9] [10] . However, these researches are restricted to the non-atomic routing game, i.e. the routing game only has the UE player with homogeneous users. In addition to non-atomic routing games, Cominetti et al. studied the efficiency loss in the atomic games with splittable flows 11 . Yang et al. investigated the efficiency loss of the selfish routing with the atomic CN players 12 . However, few scholars studied the efficiency loss of the network simultaneously with UE player and CN players. In this paper, we study the efficiency loss of UE-CN mixed equilibrium. We suppose that all users following the UE principle in their routing decisions are considered as one single UE player and every CN player controls a strictly positive splittable flow. Under this assumption, we use two methods to investigate the efficiency loss of the UE-CN mixed equilibrium. 
MIXED EQUILIBRIUM OF THE UE AND CN PLAYERS
! . This cost function is assumed to be separable in link flows and twice continuously differentiable.
Suppose all OD demands are fixed. Thus, the feasible sets of link flows by the UE player and the CN players can be defined as follows:
All users in the UE player aim to minimize their personal travel costs under the current routing decisions of the CN players, which is equivalent to solve
where the variables , v a A a K ! are taken as fixed. If t v a â h is strictly increasing, then the minimization problem (3) has a unique solution.
All users in the CN player k K ! aim to minimize the total travel cost of this specific player under the current routing decision of other players, i.e.,
where
! as the variable. It is easy to show that if t v a â h is convex, the minimization problem (4) has a unique solution.
The solution simultaneously satisfying the optimality conditions of the minimization problems (3) and (4) is called the UE-CN mixed equilibrium solution. The condition for simultaneous minimization of the problems (3) and (4) (3) and (4) 
if and only if the following inequality holds
a â h is strictly increasing and convex, the VI problem (5) has at least one solution. Define the vector of the link costs perceived by the UE and CN players on link a A ! as , , , 
holds, where , $ $ is inner product, then the VI problem (5) has at most one solution. 13 It is obvious that the VI problem (5) =^h, a A ! respectively be the solution and the aggregate link flow of the following optimization problem:
If t v a â h is strictly increasing and convex, then the problem (7) 
Since T v sô h measures the minimal total travel cost of the system and T v mix h is the sum of all subsystems' minimal travel costs, hence 1 $ t holds. Next we focus on finding the upper bound of t.
BOUNDING THE EFFICIENCY LOSS OF UE-CN MIXED EQUILIBRIUM
=^h be a solution of the minimization problem (7) . Note that v
we can obtain the next chain of inequalities and equalities: 
If we can find an upper bound for the sum of the second and the third terms in the right-hand side (RHS) of (9), we then obtain the efficiency loss of the VI problem (5). Now, we derive the upper bound of (8) by the scaling method and the nonlinear programming method, respectively. The scaling method is introduced as follows.
From inequality (9) we have max
Since the feasible region of v 0
! for every link a A ! is larger than that of X, the last inequality of (10) is satisfied.
Consider the following inequality:
where the first, second and last inequalities are satisfied respectively due to
. Obviously, F v â h is continuous in domain, so the second term in the RHS of (12) 
The inequality (13) 
$ . Thus, we conclude that the second term in the RHS of (12) has the maximum within , v 0 a mix 6 @. Rewrite the inequality (12) as
The first equation is satisfied as v uv
Thus we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Suppose that link travel cost function t v a â h, a A ! is a polynomial function and p is the highest degree of the polynomial function,
, (7) . Then the efficiency loss t of the UE-CN mixed equilibrium satisfies From (15), we have 2 3 # t . The above analyses show that in the scaling method, the efficiency loss of the UE-CN mixed equilibrium is irrelevant to the number of CN players in the network.
Next, we use the nonlinear programming method to further discuss the efficiency loss. In order to get the upper bound for the sum of the second and third terms in the RHS of (9), we first investigate the following nonlinear programming:
Since For each given link, we can find that problem (16) reaches the maximum with one and only one of the following two conditions: 
, according to Theorem 2. It should be noted that the computational burden of the scaling method is less than the nonlinear programming method, but the upper bound of efficiency loss given by the nonlinear programming method is more tight than that by the scaling method
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the upper bounds of the efficiency loss in a network with both UE player and CN players, respectively, using the scaling method and the nonlinear programming method. The analytical results show that the upper bound obtained by each of the two methods depends on the polynomial degree of the link travel cost functions. Furthermore, the upper bound by the nonlinear programming method is relevant to the number of CN players. The numerical results illustrate that our analytical results are reasonable and the scaling method is easier to implement than the nonlinear programming method, but gives a larger upper bound. This states that for getting a smaller upper bound of the efficiency loss, more factors should be taken into account. Our ongoing study is to explore the efficiency loss of the UE-CN mixed equilibrium with elastic demand.
